ABSTRACT Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are pervasive autonomous networks that will play a vital role in future Industrial Internet-of-Things communication, where smart devices will be connected in a completely distributed manner. However, due to lack of infrastructure and absence of centralized administration, MANETs are shrouded with various security threats. Some internal mobile nodes in these resource constrained networks may compromise the routing mechanism in order to launch denial-of-service attacks to carry out distinct kinds of packet forwarding misbehaviors. In order to address this issue, in our previous paper, we devised a trusted routing scheme with pattern discovery (TRS-PD), which identifies packet dropping adversaries in advance by monitoring and analyzing their behavior during route discovery phase. In this paper, we perform sensitivity analysis of TRS-PD which is carried out by varying values of different parameters in distinct network scenarios in the existence of three distinct packet dropping attacks. In addition, this work summarizes the attack-pattern discovery mechanism, trust model, and routing mechanism adopted by TRS-PD in order to counter the adversaries which follow certain attack patterns along with other adversaries. Experiments conducted with network simulator-2 indicate the correct choices of parameter values for distinct network scenarios.
mobile nodes can be easily compromised by attackers in order to perform various kinds of packet forwarding misbehaviors to launch DoS attacks. Sequence number attacks (such as blackhole and grayhole attacks) are such prominent DoS attacks against classical MANET routing protocols which may drop data packets during data transmission phase after breaking protocol rules during route discovery phase [17] . Therefore, it is imperative to prevent protocol malfunctioning at an early stage (during route discovery) to reduce further damage [18] . Trust-based secure routing has caught eyes of researchers in recent past for addressing various security issues [19] , [20] . In our previous work, we proposed a trustbased scheme (TRS-PD) [1] which aims at detecting and isolating distinct kinds of packet dropping adversaries in advance.
To the best of our knowledge, TRS-PD is the first scheme to manage trust in MANETs which attempts to discover attack patterns followed by malevolent nodes during the route discovery process. This attack pattern discovery mechanism sits on the top of the trust model and employs the Method of Common Differences for the recorded field values of route reply packet to discover attack patterns. As a result, adversaries which follow certain attack patterns are identified by the attack pattern discovery mechanism while other packet dropping adversaries are identified by the trust model in this two-tier security scheme. The experimental results shown in [1] depict that TRS-PD leads to an earlier detection of packet dropping adversaries that follow specific patterns, which in turn increases packet delivery rate. In this paper, we perform sensitivity analysis of TRS-PD under different network conditions by varying values of distrust threshold, trust update interval and trust components' weights. This analysis provides the correct tuning of values of these trust parameters in different network settings. Sensitivity analysis of TRS-PD is carried out against three distinct adversary models described in [1] by varying different network parameters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we discuss the existing trust-based routing schemes for ad-hoc networks. In Section III, we provide the discussion of our previous work, TRS-PD. In Section IV, we present the simulation results and analyze the performance of TRS-PD. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the relevant research works carried out to address the security requirements of ad-hoc routing protocols by way of trust management schemes.
Khan et al. [21] proposed a multi attribute trust framework (MATF), extended from optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol, in order to enhance security in MANETs by improving the bootstrapping time, adversary detection rate, false positive rate and packet dropping rate. Instead of using single trust attribute, MATF uses multiple attributes such as control packet generation, control packet forwarding and data packet forwarding in order to expedite trust building process. Apart from using first-hand information, it uses second-hand information from watchdog nodes whose trust values are above threshold. The results depict effectiveness of MATF against packet dropping, packet modification and link withholding attacks. Gazdar et al. [22] proposed a distributed trust computing framework (DTCF) for vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) to calculate the trust of each vehicle solely by direct observations of neighbors in order to isolate malevolent nodes. DTCF doesn't consider second-hand information; rather it considers message authentication verification as a direct trust metric. A tier-based broadcasting mechanism is implemented in order to propagate control messages and information about happening events. Simulation results show the efficiency of DTCF to detect message modification attacks with lower detection latency. Thorat and Kulkarni [23] addressed the issue of packet dropping attack with an uncertainty analysis framework (UAF) extended from ad-hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol. UAF uses direct and indirect observations in order to calculate network belief, disbelief and uncertainty (BDU) metrics based on probability of packet forwarding for neighbor nodes. Simulation results show the effect of mobility models, network density and selfish nodes on BDU values. The results indicate that as the network converges, UAF provides better knowledge about performance and security of the network by providing information about benign and distrusted nodes. In order to optimize memory resources and minimize communication overhead, Sargunavathi and Manickam [24] proposed a Collaborative Trust based Secure Routing (CTSR) protocol based on direct and indirect observations. CTSR adopts DempsterShafer approach for deriving trust values along with a twoway acknowledgement model. Information about suspicious nodes is disseminated to all the associated neighbor nodes by broadcasting a message. The authors also take into account such fabricated broadcast message propagated by malicious nodes. Simulation results depict the effectiveness of the proposed scheme under different network parameters. To discover multiple trusted paths, Li et al. [25] proposed an ad hoc on-demand trusted-path distance vector (AOTDV) protocol which is extended from AODV and ad hoc on-demand multipath distance vector (AOMDV) protocols. AOTDV provides two dimensional evaluation of paths based on hop counts and route trust values. Trust values are calculated from direct observations based on control packet forwarding ratio and data packet forwarding ratio. Simulation results show the effectiveness of AOTDV against blackhole, grayhole and modifications attacks. Jawhar et al. [26] extended dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol to devise a trust-based routing protocol for ad-hoc and sensor networks (TRAS). A route with highest trust factor is selected for data communication, while other back-up routes are used after failure of the preliminary route. The trust factor of a node is increased when it actively participates in the packet forwarding process. At the same time, the trust factor is also improved when a node participating in the data transmission receives positive acknowledgements from the destination. Simulation results depict that out of the two evaluated versions of TRAS viz. TRAS-25 and TRAS-50, TRAS-50 performs better in different scenarios. Kerrache et al. [27] proposed a hybrid trust-based framework for reliable data delivery and DoS defense (TFDD) for VANETs. TFDD takes into account trust weight and link stability to discover most trusted and nearest neighbor to forward data packets. Verification of neighbors' behavior is carried out by observation of the exchanged messages in order to improve trust relationship among nodes. Simulation results show that TFDD provides a high detection rate of dishonest nodes by meeting delay restrictions of VANET communications, even when high percentage of attackers are present in the network. A lightweight trust-based QoS routing algorithm (TQR) extended from AODV was devised by Wang et al. [28] in order to mitigate sequence number attacks. TQR aggregates link delay (includes transmission delay, propagation delay and waiting delay of a buffered packet) and trust value (direct and indirect observations for packet forwarding behavior) to establish a refined routing cost metric to find a quality trusted path during the route discovery process. Thus, TQR ensures the forwarding of the packets via trusted and least link delayed routes in order to support real time audio/video transmissions in ad-hoc networks. Simulation results show the improved performance of TQR in most scenarios against an existing scheme in terms of packet delivery ratio, average end-to-end delay, routing overhead and detection ratio. Li and Song [29] proposed an attack-resistant trust management scheme (ART) to secure VANETs against accidents and to support intelligent transportation applications. ART uses two distinct metrics for trust evaluations: data trust and node trust. Data trust is evaluated to assess trustworthiness of the traffic data aggregated from sensed data and collected data from multiple vehicles. Node trust is used to assess trustworthiness of a node to infer the capability of the node to fulfill its functionality and to figure out trustworthiness of the node's recommendations for other nodes. Simulation results demonstrate the accuracy and effectiveness of ART and its capability to cope with packet dropping attacks, bad mouthing attacks and zigzag attacks. Sethuraman and Kannan [30] proposed a refined trust energy-ad hoc on demand distance vector (ReTE-AODV) scheme which opts reliable and trusted path for sending data packets which consumes lower energy. The scheme computes direct and indirect trust values along with computation of energy value of nodes. The trust model incorporates Bayesian probability in order to handle ambiguity for acquiring the refined trust value. This energy efficient scheme promises to perform better against three existing schemes in terms of packet delivery ratio and end-to-end delay.
In spite of the presence of several schemes in the literature, there doesn't exist any scheme (to the best of our knowledge) which identifies patterns followed by adversaries (if any) during route discovery process in order to detect adversaries before they actually launch packet dropping attacks.
Therefore, we proposed a scheme in [1] which incorporates a pattern discovery mechanism with a trust model to identify the attack patterns followed by adversaries in order to improve quality-of-service (QoS) in MANETs in hostile environments. In addition, the security during analysis is necessary [31] . In future, we may consider combining watermarking [32] and access control management [33] with adhoc routing protocols in order to strengthen the security along with enhancing network capacity [34] .
III. WORKING OF TRS-PD
TRS-PD [1] is extended from AODV protocol which adopts a two tier approach in which an attack pattern discovery mechanism sits on the top of the trust model. In this section, we summarize the pattern discovery mechanism, the trust model and the routing process adopted by TRS-PD.
A. ATTACK-PATTERN DISCOVERY MECHANISM
In order to maximize the trust value in neighbor nodes, smart adversaries may pretend to be benign nodes by forwarding packets prior to launching packet dropping attacks. However, sequence number attacks launched by packet dropping adversaries may generate specific kind of patterns in fabricating some field values (such as sequence number and hop count)in the control packets during route discovery process. TRS-PD adopts a pattern discovery mechanism [1] to analyze the recorded field values from the overheard/received control packets. The field values are recorded in two sliding windows:(i) the first sliding window (SL1) records destination node's identity, current time, hop count and destination sequence number (ii) the second sliding window (SL2) records destination node's identity, current time and difference between the destination sequence numbers of the received reply packet and that of the corresponding request packet. An algorithm adopting the model of Method of Common Differences analyzes the recorded data and outputs whether the neighbor node follows any attack-pattern or not. Route discovery process is strengthened by this mechanism in isolating the blacklisted adversaries who may launch packet dropping attacks later on. However, it should be noted that malicious nodes may continue to drop packets until the monitoring node fills all slots of its sliding windows and predicts them as blacklisted nodes.
B. TRUST MODEL
The second tier of the scheme is the trust model [1] which sits below the attack-pattern discovery mechanism. While adversaries following certain attack-patterns may get detected by the pattern discovery mechanism, the other packet dropping adversaries (which do not follow any pattern) are identified by the trust model.
TRS-PD uses direct as well as indirect trust in its trust framework. A node's historical distrust value is calculated by aggregating packet dropping ratios of control and data packets. If a monitoring node observes a neighboring node crossing the distrust threshold (η), it is temporarily marked as a blacklisted node. However, such a node regaining its trust is removed from the blacklist later on if it does not follow attack-patterns and trusted neighbors have also not recommended it as a distrusted node. TRS-PD distributes responsibility to individual nodes to construct a trusted forward route rather than imposing burden on the source node.
It is to be noted that in the real world, threshold value should be determined on the basis of the safety requirements of the application. 
D. PROCEDURES OF TRUST RECOMMENDATION AND TRUST UPDATE
The trust update procedure incorporates the attack-pattern discovery mechanism to verify the attack patterns along with the calculation of distrust values (DTV) of the neighbors. In the case of finding a distrusted next hop, the monitoring node initiates a route hand-off mechanism through local route discovery process to discover an alternate trusted route to the destination. TRS-PD uses the HELLO messages in order to supply trust recommendations to the neighbor nodes. The supplied recommendations containing a list of blacklisted nodes are received from the HELLO message sent by the neighbor. If the supplier node is a trusted node, the recommendations are considered. Fig. 6 [1] represents the trust recommendation procedure (RecommendTrust) of TRS-PD.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The NS-2 network simulator is used to analyze the performance of TRS-PD by varying values of distrust threshold, trust update interval and trust components' weights (denoted as w1 and w2 for control packet dropping ratio and data packet dropping ratio respectively) under different network conditions. This sensitivity analysis of TRS-PD is carried out in the presence of malevolent nodes adopting three distinct adversary models viz. Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3 [1] . Attack1 operates in promiscuous mode and generates attack-patterns by fabricating 'hop count' information while sending a route reply packet during route discovery process. Meanwhile, Attack2 generates attack-patterns by fabricating 'destination sequence number' while sending a route reply packet. On the other side, Attack3 carries out random behavior and doesn't generate any attack-pattern during route discovery process. The operations performed by all three adversary models are discussed in [1] with pseudo-code.
In an area of 1500 m × 1500 m, benign nodes were randomly distributed which execute TRS-PD or AODV protocol. Randomly located attacker nodes selectively perform packet dropping attack by either adopting the first adversary model (Attack1), the second adversary model (Attack2) or the third adversary model (Attack3). We use User Datagram Protocol (UDP) as the transport protocol and Constant-Bit-Rate (CBR) as the traffic sources where the source nodes send4 packets per second. The experimental data represent an average value resulting from 10 distinct simulations. The major simulation parameters are represented in Table 1 .
In order to find the correct tuning, we vary the values of distrust threshold (η = 0.4 and η = 0.5), trust components' 25 . We can analyze that PDR of TRS-PD under distinct adversary models is different as mode of operations adopted by them is distinct. Meanwhile, under all three adversaries, the average PDR provided by TRS-PD with η = 0.4 is significantly better than TRS-PD with η = 0.5. We can analyze that NRO of TRS-PD under distinct adversary models is different as number of control packets generated under distinct adversary models are different. Meanwhile, under Attack1 and Attack3, TRS-PD with η = 0.4 provides significant improvement in NRO as compared to TRS-PD with η = 0.5, while under Attack2, TRS-PD with η = 0.5 performs marginally better. Fig. 9 depicts the PDR of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing mobility by taking w1 = 0.3 (and w2 = 0.7) and w1 = 0.5 (and w2 = 0.5). Fig. 9(a) shows that, under Attack1, PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 decreases from 64.85 to 50.64 and PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 decreases from 70.13 to 53.35. Fig.9 (b) shows that, under Attack2, PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 decreases from 68.69 to 60.97 and PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 decreases from 72.72 to 63.06. Fig.9 (c) shows that, under Attack3, PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 decreases from 76.17 to 69.27 and PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 decreases from 78.31 to 69.71. We can analyzethat, under all three adversaries, the average PDR provided by TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 is significantly better than TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3. Fig. 10 depicts the NRO of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing mobility by taking w1 = 0.3 and w1 = 0.5. Fig.10 (a) shows that, under Attack1, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 increases from 11.46 to 21.81 and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 increases from 9.71 to 20.15. Fig.10 (b) shows that, under Attack2, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 increases from 9.88 to 15.42 and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 increases from 8.52 to 14.51. Fig.10(c) shows that, under Attack3, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 increases from 6.57 to 10.98 and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 increases from 6.05 to 10.82 . We can analyze that TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 provides significant improvement in VOLUME 6, 2018 R NRO as compared to TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 under all three adversary models. Fig. 11 depicts the PDR of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing mobility by taking UI = 1 and UI = 3. Fig.11 (a) shows that, under Attack1, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 61.69 to 52.16 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 70.13 to 53.35. Fig.11 (b) shows that, under Attack2, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 64.38 to 56.34 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 72.72 to 63.06. Fig.11 (c) shows that, under Attack3, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 69.03 to 64.19 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 78.31 to 69.71. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average PDR provided by TRS-PD with UI = 3 is significantly better than TRS-PD with UI = 1. Fig. 12 depicts the NRO of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing mobility by taking UI = 1 and UI = 3. Fig.12 (a) shows that, under Attack1, NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 1 increases from 14.36 to 23.78 and NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 3 increases from 9.71 to 20.15. Fig.12 (b) shows that, under Attack2, NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 1 increases from 13.03 to 20.32 and NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 3 increases from 8.52 to 14.51. Fig.12 (c) shows that, under Attack3, NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 1 increases from 9.26 to 14.40 and NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 3 increases from 6.05 to 10 .82. We can analyze that TRS-PD with UI = 3 provides significant improvement in NRO as compared to TRS-PD with UI = 1 under all three adversary models.
B. TEST 2: VARYING PERCENTAGE OF MALICIOUS NODES
In this test, we evaluate the performance of TRS-PD and AODV under Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3 by varying percentage of attackers from 10% to 50% and keeping other simulation parameters fixed: mobility 10 m/sec, simulation time 200 sec and packet size 512 bytes. Fig. 13 depicts the PDR of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing percentage of adversaries by taking η = 0.4 and η = 0.5. Fig. 13 (a) shows that, under Attack1, PDR of AODV decreases from 36.51 to 19.60, while PDR of TRS-PD with η = 0.4 decreases from 70.59 to 37.26 and PDR of TRS-PD with η = 0.5 decreases from 63.70 to 28.99. Fig. 13 (b) shows that, under Attack2, PDR of AODV decreases from 56.37 to 38.71, while PDR of Fig. 15 depicts the PDR of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing percentage of adversaries by taking w1 = 0.3 (and w2 = 0.7) and w1 = 0.5 (and w2 = 0.5). Fig. 15 (a) shows that, under Attack1, PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 decreases from 66.98 to 36.69 and PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 decreases from 70.59 to 37.26. Fig. 15 (b) shows that, under Attack2, PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 decreases from 68.90 to 43.42 and PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 decreases from 74.12 to 44.82. with w1 = 0.5 decreases from 77.04 to 57.71. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average PDR provided by TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 is significantly better than TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3. Fig. 16 depicts the NRO of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing percentage of adversaries by taking w1 = 0.3 (and w2 = 0.7) and w1 = 0.5 (and w2 = 0.5). Fig. 16 (a) shows that, under Attack1, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 increases from 13.88 to 21.02 and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 increases from 12.51 to 21.44. Fig. 16 (b) shows that, under Attack2, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 increases from 12.92 to 17.01 and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 increases from 11.22 to 17.26. Fig. 16 (c) shows that, under Attack3, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 decreases from 9.89 to 6.67 and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 decreases from 9.43 to 6.20 . We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average NRO provided by TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 is considerably better than TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3. Fig. 17 depicts the PDR of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing percentage of adversaries by taking UI = 1 and UI = 3. Fig. 17 (a) shows that, under Attack1, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 63.45 to 36.97 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 70.59 to 37.26. Fig. 17 (b) shows that, under Attack2, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 65.15 to 40.20 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 74.12 to 44.82. Fig. 17 (c) shows that, under Attack3, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 67.45 to 51.08 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 77.04 to 57.71. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average PDR provided by TRS-PD with UI = 3 is significantly better than TRS-PD with UI = 1. Fig. 18 depicts the NRO of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing percentage of adversaries by taking UI = 1 and UI = 3. Fig. 18 (a) shows that, under Attack1, NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 1 increases from 17.56 to 25.29 and NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 3 increases from 12.51 to 21.60. Fig. 18 (b) shows that, under Attack2, NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 1 increases from 16.08 to 21.26 and NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 3 increases from 11.22 to 17.26. Fig. 18 (c) shows that, under Attack3, NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 14.59 to 8.35 and NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 9.43 to 6.20 . We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average NRO provided by TRS-PD with UI = 3 is significantly better than TRS-PD with UI = 1. 
C. TEST 3: VARYING DATA PAYLOAD
In this test, we evaluate the performance of TRS-PD and AODV under Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3 by varying packet size from 512 bytes to 1024 bytes and keeping other simulation parameters fixed: mobility 10 m/sec, simulation time 200 sec and percentage of adversaries 20%. Fig. 19 depicts the PDR of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing payload by taking η = 0.4 and η = 0.5. Fig. 19 (a) shows that, under Attack1, PDR of AODV decreases from 30.37 to 19.98, while PDR of TRS-PD with η = 0.4 decreases from 59.43 to 38.47 and PDR of TRS-PD with η = 0.5 decreases from 50.35 to 30.49. Fig. 19 (b) shows that, under Attack2, PDR of AODV decreases from 50.03 to 33.36, while PDR of TRS-PD with η = 0.4 decreases from 66.76 to 40.39 and PDR of TRS-PD with η = 0.5 decreases from 64.12 to 37.51. Fig. 19 (c) shows that, under Attack3, PDR of AODV decreases from 60.48 to 36.38, while PDR of TRS-PD with η = 0.4 decreases from 74.16 to 45.65 and PDR of TRS-PD with η = 0.5 decreases from 63.12 to 38.56. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average PDR provided by TRS-PD with η = 0.4 is significantly better than TRS-PD with η = 0.5. Fig. 20 (b) shows that, under Attack2, NRO of AODV increases from 7.05 to 13.44, while NRO of TRS-PD with η = 0.4 increases from 12.61 to 18.48 and NRO of TRS-PD with η = 0.5 increases from 12 to 19.49. Fig. 20 (c) shows that, under Attack3, NRO of AODV increases from 9.79 to 16.42, while NRO of TRS-PD with η = 0.4 increases from 9.14 to 14.03 and NRO of TRS-PD with η = 0.5 increases from 11.35 to 17 .59. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average NRO provided by TRS-PD with η = 0.4 is remarkably better than TRS-PD with η = 0.5. Fig. 21 depicts the PDR of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing payload by taking w1 = 0.3 (and w2 = 0.7) and w1 = 0.5 (and w2 = 0.5). Fig. 21 (a) shows that, under Attack1, PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 decreases from 56.72 to 38.58 and PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 decreases from 59.43 to 38.47. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average PDR provided by TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 is marginally better than TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3. Fig. 22 depicts the NRO of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing payload by taking w1 = 0.3 (and w2 = 0.7) and w1 = 0.5 (and w2 = 0.5). Fig. 22 (a) shows that, under Attack1, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 varies between 16.71 and 21.57, and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 varies between 16.18 and 22.98. Fig. 22 (b) shows that, under Attack2, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 varies between 13.81 and 19.96, and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 varies between 12.61 and 18.48. Fig. 22 (c) shows that, under Attack3, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 varies between 9.20 and 14.17, and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 varies between 9.14 and 14.03. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average NRO provided by TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 is slightly better than TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3. Fig. 23 depicts the PDR of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing payload by taking UI = 1 and UI = 3. Fig. 23 (a) shows that, under Attack1, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 54.68 to 35.93 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 59.43 to 38.47. Fig. 23 (b) shows that, under Attack2, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 59.68 to 36.94 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 66.76 to 40.39. Fig. 23 (c) shows that, under Attack3, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 66.71 to 42.99 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 74.16 to 45.65. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average PDR provided by TRS-PD with UI = 3 is significantly better than TRS-PD with UI = 1. Fig. 24 depicts the NRO of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing payload by taking UI = 1 and UI = 3. Fig. 24 (a) of TRS-PD with UI = 3 varies between 12.61 and 18.48. Fig. 24 (c) shows that, under Attack3, NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 1 varies between 12.75 and 17.17, and NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 3 varies between 9.14 and 14.03. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average NRO provided by TRS-PD with UI = 3 is significantly better than TRS-PD with UI = 1.
D. TEST 4: VARYING SIMULATION TIME
In this test, we evaluate the performance of TRS-PD and AODV under Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3 by varying simulation time from 200 sec to 1000 sec and keeping other simulation parameters fixed: mobility 10 m/sec, packet size 512 bytes and percentage of adversaries 20%. adversaries, the average NRO provided by TRS-PD with η = 0.4 is significantly better than TRS-PD with η = 0.5. Fig. 27 depicts the PDR of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing simulation time by taking w1 = 0.3 (and w2 = 0.7) and w1 = 0.5 (and w2 = 0.5). Fig. 27 (a) shows that, under Attack1, PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 decreases from 57.10 to 52.85 and PDR of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 decreases from 59.96 to 54.40. 13 . We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average PDR provided by TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 is considerably better than TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3. Fig. 28 depicts the NRO of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing simulation time by taking w1 = 0.3 (and w2 = 0.7) and w1 = 0.5 (and w2 = 0.5). Fig. 28 (a) shows that, under Attack1, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 increases from 16.71 to 20.91, and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 increases from 16.18 to 20.53. Fig. 28 (b) shows that, under Attack2, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 increases from 13.72 to 15.96, and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 increases from 12.61 to 15.34. Fig. 28 (c) shows that, under Attack3, NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3 increases from 8.64 to 10.20, and NRO of TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 increases from 8.49 to 9 .50. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average NRO provided by TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 is notably better than TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3. Fig. 29 depicts the PDR of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing simulation time by taking UI = 1 and UI = 3. Fig. 29 (a) shows that, under Attack1, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 56.99 to 49.86 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 59.96 to 54.40. Fig. 29 (b) shows that, under Attack2, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 59.68 to 54.35 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 66.76 to 61.36. Fig. 29 (c) shows that, under Attack3, PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 1 decreases from 67.89 to 62.33 and PDR of TRS-PD with UI = 3 decreases from 74.16 to 71.13. We can analyze that, under all three adversaries, the average PDR provided by TRS-PD with UI = 3 is significantly higher than TRS-PD with UI = 1. Fig. 30 depicts the NRO of TRS-PD under the three adversary models with increasing simulation time by taking UI = 1 and UI = 3. Fig. 30 (a) shows that, under Attack1, NRO of TRS-PD with UI = 1 increases from 18.57 to 24.48 
E. RESULT ANALYSIS
The tests conducted under different network scenarios prove that: (i) The average PDR and the average NRO provided by TRS-PD with η = 0.4 is significantly better than TRS-PD with η = 0.5. (ii) The average PDR and the average NRO provided by TRS-PD with w1 = 0.5 is considerably better than TRS-PD with w1 = 0.3. (iii) The average PDR and the average NRO provided by TRS-PD with UI = 3 is significantly better than TRS-PD with UI = 1.
V. CONCLUSION
In our previous work, we devised a novel trust based scheme (viz. TRS-PD) for MANETs in IIoT in order to identify adversaries following different kinds of attack-patterns before they actually launch packet dropping attacks. The scheme intended to isolate the adversaries at an early stage in order to improve the quality-of-services. In this work, we attempt to identify the best choices of values of distinct parameters by carrying out sensitivity analysis of the scheme. The sensitivity analysis is carried out in different network conditions by taking packet delivery ratio and normalized routing overhead as the performance metrics, and varying the values of distrust threshold, trust component's weight and trust update interval.
The results depict that distrust threshold is a critical component of any trust-based scheme which should be set conservatively in order to optimize the detection rate of the scheme. At the same time, both the distrust components (data packet drop ratio and control packet drop ratio) should be given equal importance as the adversaries attempt to trap benign nodes during route discovery process followed by packet dropping misbehaviors during data transmission process. Moreover, trust update interval is a key component which significantly affects the performance of a trust-based scheme as frequent updates in the distrust values may lead to increased false positives/false negatives and unnecessary route alterations. Hence, we can conclude that it is imperative to carry out sensitivity analysis of a security scheme in order to tune the parameter values for different network conditions. 
